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TORTS - LIABILITY OF U-DRIVE-IT
CORPORATION TO THIRD PARTY
A recent Georgia decision' serves as a convenient starting
point for a view of the liability of U-Drive-It companies to
third parties because of negligence of the company or operator
of the automobile. The basis of the Georgia decision is a
statute forbidding the loan or rental of an automobile unless
the person to whom it is rented exhibits a valid operator's
license. Here, the agency rented an automobile to a young
woman in violation of the statute. She had no license and
was in fact incompetent to drive. The plaintiff, a pedestrian,
was injured by the rented automobile and brought this action
against the driver and the auto rental agency, alleging the
negligence of the latter in renting the automobile in violation
of the statute as the proximate cause of his injuries. The de-
fendant argued that it could not be held liable since it was
without actual knowledge of the renter's incompetency. The
court ruled that actual knowledge of the incompetence was
unnecessary to create liability when the owner was bound in
law to ascertain whether or not she had a driver's license.
This opinion represents a tendency of the courts and legis-
latures to broaden liability on the part of U-Drive-It companies
as their services become more widely used.
The first cases of injuries to third parties by rented auto-
mobiles date from the early nineteen-twenties. In these cases
the courts applied, in the absence of statute, the general princi-
ples of the law of bailment. The general rule is that the bailor
is not responsible for the negligence of the bailee. An excep-
tion to the general rule arises when the owner is negligent
in leasing a defective automobile or hiring it to one whom
he knew or reasonably should have known was not a proper
person to operate it on the highway2. The courts in early
decisions hesitated to fix liability in the absence of proof that
the bailor was clearly negligent in renting to an obviously
1 Jones v. Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System, Inc., 97 Ga. 669, 104 S.E.2d 497
(1958).
2 7 A Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, 5237 (1928).
incompetent operator. In Otupalik v. Phelps3 the court held
that there was no common law rule making the bailor of
an automobile liable to a third party unless the relation was
that of master and servant or the bailment had been made
to an infant, lunatic, or intoxicated person. In a Louisiana
case4, an automobile had been rented to the same unlicensed
operator on four previous occasions before an accident occurred.
The court felt that since the renter had returned the car
without an accident each time that there was no necessity for
the defendant to make further inquiry before renting the car.
As a result of the increased hazards of the present wide-
spread use of automobiles and the resultant volume of litiga-
tion, many jurisdictions have added regulations to their motor
vehicle codes pertaining specifically to the U-Drive-It business.
In Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. City of Cincinnati5 the
Supreme Court of Ohio said:
The fact that automobiles of this class are operated
by persons who have no ownership in the operated
automobiles and that they operate under a contract
which exempts the owner from the application of the
doctrine of respondeat superior which operation has
been found by the experience of insurance companies
skilled in determining degrees of hazard to be extra-
hazardous to the public-is quite sufficient to warrant
a classification of this character of automobiles sepa-
rate from all others and to warrant a reasonable regu-
lation of the class.
These statutes, many of them similar to the Georgia de-
cision under discussion, have put the U-Drive-It companies
under greater control and have subjected them to greater lia-
bility in the event of injury to third parties. In addition to
preventing the operation of vehicles by unqualified persons,
the statutes establish a standard of care which must be followed
in ascertaining to whom the automobiles may be rented. Vio-
3 73 Colo. 433, 216 Pac. 541 (1923).
4 Anderson v. Driverless Cars, Inc., 111 La. 515, 124 So. 312 (1929).
5 123 Ohio St. 284, 175 N.E. 196, 77 A.LR. 889 (1931).
lation of its statutory duty may render the U-Drive-It auto-
mobile owner jointly liable with the negligent operator. The
fact that a U-Drive-It rents an automobile to an unlicensed
driver in violation of a statute does not of itself impose lia-
bility for negligent injury caused by the driver. The evidence
must show in addition to the violation of statute that the vio-
lation was the cause of the injury. If the evidence establishes
the driver's competency, the question of proximate cause is
one for the court and the violation is not negligence per se 6.
A few jurisdictions impose liability upon the U-Drive-It
agency whether or not there is negligence in the leasing of
the automobile. As interpreted in Graham v. Wilkens7 , the
Connecticut statute reads:
Any person renting or leasing to another any motor
vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage
to any person caused by the operation of such motor
vehicle while so rented or leased to the same extent
as the operator would have been liable if he had also
been the owner'.
A Kentucky statute9 attacks the problem differently, but
the effects are similar.
The statute does not undertake to enlarge the com-
mon law liability of persons engaged in the U-Drive-It
business and to fix upon them personal liability for
the torts of their lessees. What the statute does require
is that lessors who do business upon the highways for
6 Hertz-Drive-It-Ur-Self System of Colo. v. Hendrickson, 109 Colo. 1, 121
P.2d 483, 168 A.L.R. 1384 (1942).
7 Graham v. Wilkens, 145 Conn. 34, 138 Atl.2d 705 (1958).
8 Connecticut General Statutes, § 2479 (1949).
9 Kentucky Rev. St. 187.640 (1948). "No person shall engage in business
of leasing, renting, or letting out for hire, motor vehicles to be used
for the transportation of persons but for which no driver is furnished,
such business being commonly known as the 'U-Drive-It' or 'Rent-A-Car'
business, until he has filed with the Department of Revenue an in-
surance policy, covering the owner as the named insured, and meeting
the requirements provided for in KRS 187.490, or has qualified as a
self insuror in the same manner as provided for in KRS 187.600."
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a profit give security (by filing an insurance policy
with the Department of Revenue) that their lessees
shall respond in damages for the latter's torts.
The Florida courts adhering to the doctrine that a motor
vehicle while being operated on the highways is a dangerous
instrumentality, have held that one entrusting a vehicle to
any person is liable for the consequences" .
The preceding are representative of a number of juris-
dictions which have imposed liability upon the U-Drive-It
companies without negligence in renting their automobiles.
A great many other jurisdictions have some regulatory statute;
the most common being those which prohibit the rental of a
vehicle unless the renter exhibits a valid operator's license.
In view of this it is surprising that Virginia has only one
narrow statute on the subject. Section 46.1-14 of the Code"'
requires persons renting motor vehicles without drivers to
keep a record of the identity of the person to whom the vehicle
is rented, the time and place of rental, and provide for the
inspection of these records by any person who has been
damaged in person or property. No Virginia statute imputes
the bailee's negligence in operation to his bailor. Protection
of third parties injured by such negligence seems to be covered
however by the requirement of an omnibus clause in every
automobile liability policy issued within the Commonwealth 2 .
Under this section anyone operating an insured motor vehicle
with the express or implied permission of the owner is covered
by the owner's insurance whether or not the owner is liable"3 .
Therefore the statute indirectly forces the auto rental agencies
to exercise more than the legal minimum of care. Repeated
instances of hiring to incompetent, unlicensed operators who
later precipitate accidents will cause the insurance premiums
of careless rental agencies to rise to prohibitive levels. Self
)LO Foremost Dairies v. Godwin, 158 Fla. 245, 26 So.2d 773 (1946).
11 Va. Code Ann.
12 Va. Code Ann., § 38.1-381.
13 Newton v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 107 F.2d 164 (1957).
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interest will cause the U-Drive-It companies to check more
carefully the qualifications of those to whom their cars are
leased.
Nevertheless to assure full protection to third parties such
indirect measures are not enough. The Virginia Code should
be amended to include a provision similar to the Georgia
statute which requires a rental agency to check the operator's
license of every person seeking to rent a motor vehicle within
the Commonwealth. Under present Virginia law an unlicensed,
incompetent driver may legally rent a U-Drive-It automobile.
Under present-day traffic conditions this situation should be
quickly remedied.
D. B.
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